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Indian and Chinese military capabilities in the border areas and 
certain other background material were covered in SNIE 13/31-62, 
"Short-Term Outlook and Implications for the Sino-Indian Con-
flict," dated 9 November 1962. The present estimate seeks to 
examine the broader implications of the situation for future 
policies of India, Pakistan, Communist China, and the USSR, 





1. India's policy, both foreign and domestic, will almost certainly 
be dominated for a considerable time to come by the image of Com-
munist China as the major threat to its national existence. A con-
viction of Peiping's fundamental hostility and perfidy has emerged 
among virtually all levels of Indian opinion in the past few months. 
Concern over new Chinese attacks and fear that these may spread beyond 
the disputed border area are great. At the same time, there is general 
gratification with the sympathy and support received from the US 
and the British Commonwealth and a growing realization that the 
preservation of India's freedom will be heavily dependent on the West. 
2. Within the Indian Government, new, more pragmatic, more pro-
Western attitudes are emerging in the wake of Krishna Menon's dis-
missal. Nehru is being forced to share leadership with younger and 
more vigorous politicians, many of whom have never approved his ideo-
logical predilections. These men, by and large, are probably prepared 
to pay a higher price than Nehru for national security in terms of in-
ternal military costs, cooperation with the US, and even compromise 
with Pakistan. They will also be less inclined to tolerate Communist 
activity within India. Finally, their emergence on the wave of the 
present crisis may over the longer run do much to fill the gap which 
was considered likely to follow Nehru's departure from the Indian 
scene. 
3. At the moment India is in the grip of a nationalistic fervor which 
has submerged many local differences in a widespread determination to 
avenge the country's military humiliation by the Chinese. Under pres-
ent circumstances, it appears unlikely that for the next year or two at 
least India will undertake any negotiations with Peiping seriously aiming 
at a settlement. Rather the trend will be to strengthen the Indian 
military establishment and the country's overall power position, while 
seeking at least for a time to avoid new clashes which might further 
damage the country's military posture. Over the longer term, the 
Indians will probably come to realize the difficulty of making good on 
all their territorial claims and may be willing to come to the negotiating 
table. 
4. India will inevitably experience some discontent with the sacrifices 
required to gear up the nation for a prolonged struggle, some frustra-
tion over the difficulty of scoring decisively in the struggle, and some 
discontent with the pace and scope of Western support. There will also 
be general nostalgia for the halcyon days of neutralism, continued hopes 
2 
'ECliiif 
that in some fashion the Soviets will restrain the Chinese, and con-
siderable reluctance to face up to the costs of improving India's relations 
with Pakistan. Nehru, in particular, is likely to be vacillating and on 
occasion intransigent. 
5. Nevertheless, we believe that a profound change has taken place 
in India's outlook. New Delhi's disillusionment with the results of its 
traditional foreign policy is already being translated into impatience 
with the attitudes of many of its former associates in the neutralist 
camp. Though Indian fears of a "return of British imperialism" will 
not disappear overnight, the practical benefits of Commonwealth mem-
bership have become obvious, and further strengthening of ties with 
the UK seems virtually certain. The confidence with which India turned 
to the US in its hour of peril suggests the persistence of an underlying 
trust in the US which could be further manifested in the future through 
greater understanding for the US role in containing Communist aggres-
sion in other parts of the world. 
II. COMMUNIST CHINA 
6. Peiping will remain determined to retain certain strategically im-
portant portions of the territory it has occupied, principally the Aksai 
Chin plateau in Ladakh, and to demonstrate that it will not be pushed 
around by its weaker neighbor, India. At the same time, it has avoided 
building up popular pressure for war with India at home, and probably 
hopes to avoid forcing India to total commitment to the West. Having 
proved itself to be powerful and dynamic, Peiping probably now wishes to 
show that its strength does not imply aggressive intent toward the Afro-
Asian world. To this end, it will almost certainly continue to emphasize 
its willingness to withdraw from much of the territory it has occupied 
and to extol the benefits of negotiations. 
7. Although the Chinese Communists have the capability to renew 
the offensive in the Ladakh and NEFA areas at any time, we believe 
they will wish to avoid the resumption of large-scale military activity. 
They would, however, almost certainly react sharply should the Indians 
attempt to re-establish their lost positions by force. A high level of 
tension will persist for some time, and both sides are taking steps to 
improve their military capabilities in the border area. Hence, even a 
minor incident might escalate rapidly into another outburst of fighting 
at least as large as that which took place in October and November of 
this year. 
Ill. PAKISTAN 
8. Pakistani leaders are apprehensive that the new-found identity of 
interest between India and the West will undermine their own interests 
and security. At the same time, they believe the present Chinese pres-
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sure on India and India's virtually complete dependence on the West 
represent an unprecedented chance to secure an acceptable sol.ution of 
the Kashmir problem. Despite India's agreement to negotiate ~he 
status of Kashmir Pakistan's leaders have strong doubts that the Indian 
position will be ;ufficiently forthcoming to n:ake ag~eemei:t. possible. 
President Ayub realizes that any settlement will require politically un-
popular concessions by both sides and does not seem determined to 
insist on all of Pakistan's claims. However, Ayub's room for maneuver 
has been circumscribed by the recent strong outburst of anti-Western 
and anti-Indian opinion in Pakistan. 
9. Whether or not Indian attitudes will change sufficiently to make 
possible a settlement of the Kashmir dispute is still uncertain. The 
redeployment of more than half of the Indian troops stationed along 
the Pakistani border and Nehru's undertaking to discuss the question 
of Kashmir with President Ayub evidence greater Indian willingness 
to make progress on Kashmir than ever before. Nevertheless, India's 
willingness to make any significant concessions will be heavily influenced 
by the acuteness of India's apprehensions with regard to China and the 
extent to which the US and UK maintain pressure on it for serious 
negotiations on Kashmir. 
10. Unless progress can be maintained toward an acceptable solution 
on Kashmir, Pakistani relations with India will become more embittered 
than ever. If in these circumstances the West were to continue large-
scale military aid to India, Pakistan would adopt an increasingly anti-
Western stance. Strong pressures would build up for an accommodation 
with the Chinese Communists and Pakistan's alliance with the West 
would be in jeopardy. 
IV. THE NEUTRALIST CAMP 
11. In general, the other Asian and African states with which India 
has been associated in the "neutralist camp" have conspicuously failed 
to rally to India's support. These nations, which wish above all to 
prevent the outbreak of large-scale war, have felt obliged to assist in 
the ending of hostilities. While pleas for a peaceful settlement of 
the dispute will almost certainly continue to emerge from the nonaligned 
nations, these pleas in themselves are unlikely to have significant in-
fluence on either India or China. 
12. In the longer run, at least some of the neutralist states may recog-
nize (a) that neutralism has not protected India from a Chinese attack 
which the USSR was unwilling or unable to prevent, and (b) that 
the West has proved ready to aid a beleaguered neutralist. Though 
some of these states may be persuaded to adopt less critical attitudes 
toward the US, few if any are likely to abandon their basic neutralist 
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positions unless they themselves come under an immediate threat of 
direct Communist attack. 
V. THE USSR 
13. The Sino-Indian conflict has seriously complicated the Soviet 
Union's relations with India and aggravated its difficulties with China. 
Under these circumstances, the immediate Soviet objective will almost 
certainly be to secure an early resolution of the conflict. Apart from 
this, however, the USSR will place a high value on a continued close 
relationship with India. While its opportunity to build up lasting 
influence in the Indian military has virtually disappeared, it will prob-
ably continue to supply some military equipment and to maintain its 
economic ties with India and its support of India's economic development 
programs. 
VI. THE WEST 
14. The metamorphosis which India is undergoing will almost cer-
tainly continue to open up new opportunities for the West. For the 
next year or two at least, New Delhi will be more susceptible than ever 
before to influence by the US and the UK, particularly in the military 
field. These opportunities will also bring with them new problems. 
India's reawakened nationalist fervor and desire to avenge its military 
humiliation could lead it to propose large-scale offensives which would 
be beyond its capability to carry through. If the West were unwilling 
to become involved in supporting a prolonged military operation, the 
consequence could be progressive Indian disillusionment with the West. 
A less drastic but more difficult problem lies in the necessity of trying 
to minimize the impact which a new military burden will almost cer-
tainly have on India's vital economic development program. 
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